Curve is a decentralised exchange protocol using automated market makers for stablecoins and other assets. Its StableSwap design concentrates liquidity around the relative prices expected for closely related assets. Curve also develops crvUSD and the Llamalend lending system, and its governance uses locked CRV tokens.123

StableSwapReport an error

Egorov's November 2019 paper describes a pricing rule between constant-sum and constant-product market makers. Near balanced reserves, the curve is relatively flat, allowing trades with low price impact. As reserves become more imbalanced, pricing moves toward constant-product behaviour. An amplification parameter controls that relationship.1

This design targets liquidity efficiency around an expected price relationship. It does not establish that a stablecoin remains redeemable or that two assets must keep the same value. Curve's broader exchange documentation also covers volatile-asset markets.12

Lending and crvUSDReport an error

Curve describes crvUSD as a collateralised-debt stablecoin and Llamalend as a permissionless lending protocol. Both use LLAMMA, which converts collateral progressively across price bands. Its documentation cautions that these conversions can incur losses and still lead to full liquidation; gradual conversion does not eliminate borrower risk.2

GovernanceReport an error

Users obtain veCRV voting power by locking CRV for a chosen period, up to four years. veCRV is not transferable and declines as the lock approaches expiry. It provides voting power, participation in fee distribution, and potential boosts to liquidity incentives.3

Gauge-weight votes determine where CRV emissions are distributed. The governance documentation distinguishes these votes from broader proposals to change the protocol. Governance decisions for deployments on other networks can originate on Ethereum and be communicated across chains.4

IncidentsReport an error

Curve pools were exploited in July 2023. A December governance proposal identified alETH/ETH, pETH/ETH, msETH/ETH, and CRV/ETH as affected pools and proposed vesting CRV from the community fund to compensate liquidity providers. It expressly noted that CRV price changes meant the proposed distribution could not guarantee full compensation in dollar terms.5

Curve reported that its curve.fi domain was hijacked on 12 May 2025, redirecting visitors to a page soliciting wallet signatures. In its postmortem, the team said the protocol contracts remained operational and described moving access to curve.finance. This was a website-domain incident, distinct from a change to the onchain contracts.6

TimelineReport an error

Date Event
2019-11-10 StableSwap paper dated1
2020 veCRV governance model launches3
2023-07 Several Curve pools exploited5
2023-12-17 Compensation proposal published5
2025-05-12 curve.fi domain hijacked6

See alsoReport an error

ReferencesReport an error

  1. ^ a b c d Egorov, M. (10 November 2019). StableSwap — efficient mechanism for stablecoin liquidity. https://curve.fi/files/stableswap-paper.pdf 

  2. ^ a b c Curve. What is Curve? https://docs.curve.finance/user/introduction 

  3. ^ a b c Curve. What is veCRV? https://docs.curve.finance/user/vecrv/what-is-vecrv 

  4. ^ Curve. DAO and governance overview. https://docs.curve.finance/user/dao/overview 

  5. ^ a b c Curve governance forum (17 December 2023). Proposal to recompensate LPs affected by Curve pool exploit. https://gov.curve.finance/t/proposal-to-recompensate-lps-affected-by-curve-pool-exploit/9825/ 

  6. ^ a b Curve (19 May 2025). Curve domain incident. https://news.curve.finance/curve-domain-incident/